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SEMINAR O N  STATE R E F O R M  A N D  M ODERNIZATION IN LATIN A MERICA 
(Mexico City, 18-20 May 1994) 
Edgardo Boeninger
Author’s note: This document represents an attempt to deal with the subject matter in a way that 
facilitates, without losing sight o f  the tremendous diversity o f existing situations in Latin America, the 
identification o f  a common set o f  problems, challenges and opportunities. Therefore, although these 
considerations are based on the Chilean experience, they are being presented as inputs for a debate 
geared towards drawing more generally valid conclusions.
SUBJECT AREA I: DIAGNOSTIC STUDY OF P R O B L E M S  IN ADAPTING 
T H E  STATE T O  PREVAILING CONDITIONS 
I.A. Perennial problems of the Latin American State
In Latin America, the State exhibits highly diverse levels o f  institutional stability and continuity and 
significant disparities with respect to political cohesiveness and theoretical and managerial capacity. 
W ithout ignoring that diversity, it can be asserted that all the countries o f the region have suffered 
or are still grappling with an array o f political, technical, institutional and other problems which are 
often  chronic or recurrent. They include the following:
1. Political instability, manifested by a fragile democratic system or, at least, the lack o f a 
reasonably durable and cohesive political majority.
2. W eakness o f  som e o f the key institutions o f democracy, such as the system o f political parties 
and the legislative and judicial branches o f government.
3. W eakness and fragmentation o f the social organizations with the greatest potential for 
exercising national influence, with consequent difficulties in forming stable bases o f  social 
support for government administration and, especially, econom ic policies.
4. The predominance o f  populism as a symptom o f  the State’s institutional weakness and o f  the 
illusion that developm ent can be achieved and living standards raised without cost or sacrifice
for anyone, and as a predictable outcom e o f direct communication between leaders who rely 
on  personal charisma and "their people".
5. Technical and institutional weakness o f  the State owing to the difficulty o f  attracting and 
retaining a sufficiently large core group o f  high-level professionals and to the absence o f a 
public ethos and espñt de cotps that give the State enough autonomy to act independently o f  
the interests o f  specific people and groups, which, in extrem e cases, has led to situations 
where control o f  the State becom es the "spoils" o f  the victors.
6. A s a consequence o f these problems, only in rare instances has a Latin American State
successfully developed a "national agenda" lor achieving a "vision o f the country" that enables 
it to play an effective leadership role capable o f  generating loyalty and mobilizing national 
energies. (The Brazilian "miracle" o f the 1970s and the Acción Democrática (A D )-C om ité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independiente (CO PEI) consensus reached in V enezuela
while that country was consolidating its democracy could be cited as exceptions, together with
the solidity o f  Costa R ica’s democratic Government.)
7. Undoubtedly, these problems are compounded by the related (though different and parallel) 
scourges o f  corruption and drug trafficking.
8. Lastly, after decades o f the instability, stagnation and other phenom ena mentioned above, 
Latin America still suffers from the basic problems o f  poverty —which affects a high 
proportion o f  its population, and often contrasts dramatically with the opulence o f  a 
privileged few—, acute inequality o f  opportunity and the unsatisfied aspirations o f  middle-class 
urban sectors with a modest standard o f  living but considerable capacity to exert political 
pressure; all o f  these problems have a violent and persistent impact on the State.
I.B. Emerging problems of the Latin American State
1. Latin America is a full participant in two contemporary megatrends: the shift towards
democratic political systems and the building o f market econom ies dominated by private 
enterprise, which forge links with the world econom y and open them selves to it at different 
speeds and to varying degrees.
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Today, Latin America has a firmer foundation on which to build democracy and market 
econom ies. This outcom e was influenced by the fall o f socialist systems, the end o f  the cold 
war and the crumbling o f  the support which developed countries o f  the W est formerly 
provided to various dictatorships merely because they were anti-communist. T he principle o f  
respect for human rights has becom e so universally recognized that it tends to legitimize 
intervention in the internal affairs o f  other States in the name o f that principle. O pen market 
econom ies are now considered the only developm ent option, as there are currently no 
significant political movements in the region that postulate the contrary, although som e new  
(albeit still incipient) opposition ideologies are emerging, as in the case o f  som e ecological 
m ovements, in their more extreme forms.
This poses specific challenges to the countries —and especially the Governments— o f  Latin 
America. Although Latin America’s formal political culture is one o f democracy, more than 
a few o f  the countries o f the region have an authoritarian tradition, with the recurrent 
predominance o f paternalistic or merely charismatic figures as leaders or presidents. The new 
circumstances have made it imperative to continue to develop and consolidate a political 
culture o f  democracy, as a precondition for building solid institutions and ensuring full and 
permanent respect for the rule o f  law.
2. The consolidation o f market econom ies is even more complex because, unlike democracy, 
they do not represent an aspiration or value held by a majority o f the population. In Latin 
America, the market econom y has gained acceptance by exclusion —i.e., in the absence o f an 
alternative—, not by conviction or because it inspires enthusiasm. This creates the problem o f  
how to win enough sustained social and political support for a developm ent agenda with those 
features. The widespread perception that the market econom y tends to produce a basically 
unjust distribution o f wealth, together with the aversion to the idea o f "lucre" that 
characterizes both the Marxist and Catholic traditions, have instilled a degree o f instictive 
antagonism to this model. This is compounded by the ethical principle that the poor "cannot 
wait" and the political principle that the middle social strata with low or modest incomes "will 
not wait" (reflecting the fact that the latter group has a capacity for political pressure that the 
poor usually lack).
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T he globalization o f the world econom y and the Latin American countries’ growing 
involvement in that process have had the internal political effects o f  eroding the State’s 
sovereignty and curtailing its autonomy in making policy choices on econom ic issues. Policy 
decisions on tariffs, taxes, exchange rates, interest rates or various kinds o f  government 
controls may be incompatible with the rules o f the game o f  an open econom y, if they conflict 
with the operations o f  markets.
T he preceding observation is particularly relevant to wage policies and labour relations in 
general. In an open economy, pay levels should react to and be determined by productivity 
and com petitiveness, since this system leaves no room for the types o f alliances between  
workers and employers in specific sectors which, in the past, established wage and price 
patterns for the products involved and imposed them on the rest o f the country. Moreover, 
the new order offers little room for political arbitration on pay levels in cases o f  social 
conflict, or for redistributive policies based on increases in nominal wages.
The restrictions which the new circumstances place on public action in econom ic matters 
should, however, be reconciled with the need to achieve and maintain reasonable levels o f  
social harmony (without which political stability and sustained econom ic growth are 
impossible) through persistent and effective action in the social field to redress the problems 
o f  poverty, unequal opportunity and the other inequities that plague Latin American societies.
In the democratic Chile o f the past four years, the concept o f growth with social equity in a 
constantly improving democratic system has been devised as a conceptual and operational 
response which will serve as the linchpin o f a "country agenda" to guide State action.
T ogether with the aforementioned developments, the countries are witnessing a growing 
social diversification manifested by the dual phenomena o f  a better-organized civil society (as 
exemplified by trade unions and professional associations, neighbourhood associations, 
parents’ groups, etc.) and processes o f territorial decentralization that strengthen the powers 
o f local (municipalities, communities) and regional (regions, provinces, states) authorities. This 
is another process that erodes the central Governm ent’s power. In all o f  these areas, the aim 
is to reconcile the necessary and inevitable shift towards a more participatory democracy
—which entails the delegation o f  authority, decision-making powers and resources from the 
State to society and from the central Government to regions and communities— with the 
requirements o f  a coherent national policy to address the demands o f  econom ic developm ent 
and social progress.
Chile has reverted to the system o f  municipal authorities (a mayor and a municipal council) 
elected by popular vote, and has established a new system o f  regional governments (dividing 
the country into 13 regions), to which considerable powers and budgetary resources have been  
transferred. The Government is fully aware that these changes pose an enormous challenge 
with regard to administrative capacity.
7. Integration into the world economy, in turn, com pels the Latin American Governments to 
choose among several options currently being debated. Chile is strongly in favour o f  
implementing a multidimensional strategy that solidly endorses wide-ranging, overall freedom  
o f  trade while simultaneously taking advantage o f  any opportunities to enter into regional or 
bilateral agreements, as long as the latter are compatible with G A T T  rules and help to 
increase (and not merely redirect) net trade.
8. M ore specifically, in terms o f public administration, it has been stressed repeatedly that the 
State must be scaled down, primarily by privatizing public enterprises. However, the problem  
is not so simple. Although it is true that the State in Latin America generally has too many 
em ployees and too many functions, the aim should not be merely to shrink it as much as 
possible. The real challenge is to build a Slate that is smaller (measured in terms o f  public 
em ployees and number o f  institutions and activities), but also more solid, with robust technical 
capacity, superior strength and greater political cohesiveness, and able to perform effectively  
the various functions demanded o f it by contemporary circumstances. The effective exercise 
o f authority, within the confines o f  the rule o f  law, and the capacity to resolve problems and 
conflicts and to implement policies and programmes —i.e., to get things done by translating 
decisions into effective action— are attributes o f  the contemporary State in which the Latin 
American countries must acknowledge their severe shortcomings.
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SUBJECT AR E A  II: ANALYSIS OF  PROCESSES O F  STATE REFORM, 
MODE R N I Z A T I O N  A N D  ADAPTATION (completed or under way)
II.A. Reforms undertaken in Chile
I .  Political reforms
a. T he first major reform was the 1989 constitutional agreement betw een the outgoing  
military regime and the members o f the Coalition o f  Parties for Democracy (the 
opposition at the time, which had won the 1988 plebiscite in which the citizenry 
rejected continued rule by the authoritarian regime after 1989). T hese consensual 
reforms were the first basic step in the process o f  building political consensus in the 
country, since they allowed the democratic opposition to recognize, as amended, the 
1980 Constitution, which they had previously rejected as illegitimate in origin and 
anti-democratic in content.
Thus, the first important State reform provided political rules o f the game that were 
acceptable to all sectors. Moreover, it was agreed that subsequent reforms o f the 
Constitution would follow the procedure decided upon at that time; this agreement 
has been fully respected. The political uncertainty that had seriously jeopardized the 
country’s stability and developm ent was thereby eliminated.
b. The democratization of municipal authorities under the relevant constitutional and 
legal reform (1991) provided for the election o f mayors and municipal councils by 
popular vole, thereby legitimizing local authorities, who had previously been  
appointed by the President o f the Republic.
c. T he establishment of regional governments took place under another constitutional 
and legal reform (1992). The governments o f the country’s 13 regions, whose 
decentralization makes them more responsive to popular pressure, consist o f  a 
regional executive branch and a regional council. The former is headed by a governor, 
appointed by the President o f the Republic, who collaborates directly with regional
ministerial secretaries, also appointed by the President. The members o f  the regional 
councils, in contrast, are elected by indirect popular vote.
d. Reform of the judicial branch of government. A  set o f draft laws has been designed
to modernize and streamline the Justice Department and make it more transparent; 
reduce the Supreme Court’s control over lower courts, which it had traditionally 
exercised without a counterweight; improve and expedite judicial procedures designed  
to safeguard the human and property rights o f individuals; and —as the gist o f  the 
reform— ensure equal access to legal recourse. T hese draft laws are currently being 
debated in the legislature.
Economic reforms
a. Consolidation of property law, particularly under explicit rules contained in the 1980 
Constitution and through complementary legislation, such as the law giving individuals 
and enterprises recourse to the courts o f justice under the so-called remedy o f  
protection if they consider that their rights have been violated.
b. Unilateral economic liberalization through a generalized tariff cut that reduced tariffs
to 15% during the military government and 11% during the Aylwin administration 
(with the unanimous approval o f the National Congress). At the same time, steps 
were taken to eliminate all non-tariff barriers.
c. Autonomy of the Central Bank, expressly provided for in the 1980 Constitution,
w hose regulations in that regard were com plem ented by the Bank’s own Charter. This 
reform, which was widely criticized at first, is now firmly established and supported by 
all sectors. Monetary and exchange-rate policy are based in the Bank; the Ministry o f  
Finance can influence these policies only through technical dialogue and persuasion. 
T he Bank’s directors are nominated by the President o f  the Republic and appointed 
by special quorum (broad consensus) o f  the Senate.
In effect, the coordination and agreement between the Bank and the Ministry of
Finance on policy matters is based on the political consensus that most o f  the Bank’s 
directors should be technically well-qualified and acceptable to the opposition, but 
politically close to the Government. In this way, a "majority for cooperation" was 
formed, without prejudice to the institution’s autonomy.
Social security reform consisted o f replacing the traditional State-run system o f  
distributing benefits (whose shortfalls had also been State-financed) with a system o f  
individual capitalization through a variety o f  pension funds run by private companies 
com peting among themselves for the voluntary affiliation o f contributors. The State, 
for its part, guarantees a minimum pension by financing the difference between the 
legal minimum and the retirement benefits paid out by a pension fund, if they are 
lower than the minimum.
At the same time, the new system has accumulated a huge and growing stock o f  
savings which, pursuant to the legislation in force (which is progressively becoming 
more flexible), is invested in various financial instruments, including shares o f  stock, 
while a still-limited proportion is invested abroad.
Reform of labour legislation. Two phases o f labour reform are clearly distinguishable. 
The first, decreed by the military government, gave the labour market maximum 
flexibility by facilitating dismissals; eliminating the State’s traditional role in arbitrating 
wage disputes through its participation in so-called tripartite commissions; restricting 
collective bargaining; and abrogating, in practice, the right to strike. This phase 
represented a reaction to the power and political partisanship o f  union leaders in 
previous years, and was intended to facilitate the operations o f  private enterprise by 
eliminating the counterweight o f  unions and the political negotiation o f  wages. 
Naturally, these rules were fiercely rejected by workers, who refused to recognize 
them as legitimate.
The second phase (reform o f  the reform) was implemented by the administration of 
President Aylwin; its basic aim was to ensure that relations between employers and 
workers were governed by rules o f the game w hose legitimacy was recognized by all. 
To that end, the Government held a wide-ranging debate on the relevant draft laws
with employers and workers, whose representatives were also duly considered in the 
subsequent legislative debate. By this means —though different parties disagreed with 
specific rules contained in one or the other o f  the laws which the Congress ultimately 
passed—, the Government won full recognition o f  the legitimacy o f  the new rules and, 
consequently, respect for their provisions.
Essentially, the Aylwin administration’s labour reforms created a better balance in 
labour relations by extending the use o f  collective bargaining and making it more 
effective (without abandoning the idea that it should be bipartite; i.e., keeping the 
State out o f the process); fully reinstating the right to strike (while maintaining certain 
disincentives and costs to promote responsibility in the exercise o f  this right); and 
improving protection for workers by raising the cost o f  dismissals, but preserving the 
principle o f flexibility in the labour market to help firms make the necessary 
adjustment to the changes in technological, financial and market conditions so as to 
maintain their com petitiveness, and especially their export momentum.
Tax reform. The military government implemented an initial tax reform that 
significantly reduced Laxes on individuals, effectively eliminated the tax on corporate 
profits and introduced a value-added tax (V A T) to replace the traditional sales tax.
The Aylwin administration pushed through a new tax reform basically intended to 
mobilize resources with which the State could keep its promise to broaden its social 
programmes significantly in response to the acute inequities observed (termed the 
"social debt") and the deterioration in specific areas such as education, health care, 
housing, minimum pensions and various subsidies for the poor.
T he reform moderately increased direct taxes by reinstating a 15% tax on corporate 
profits, and maintained the VAT, increasing it by 2%. Along with other minor 
provisions, these measures, together with the larger amounts collected as a result o f  
econom ic growth (an average o f 6% over the past four years) and fewer instances o f  
tax evasion as a result o f more efficient controls —technically facilitated by the V A T—, 
boosted fiscal revenues to the point where the Government was able to increase its
social expenditure by 10% to 12% a year in real terms, while generating a fiscal 
surplus equalling 2% to 3% o f G DP.
It should be noted that the legislators o f  the main opposition party voted in favour 
o f  this reform and that it was adopted with the acquiescence o f the business 
community, in a highly significant manifestation o f  basic national consensus that has 
enabled the State to implement its policies. This consensus materialized again in 1993, 
when som e taxes approved only provisionally in 1991 were made permanent and a 
moderate reduction in taxes on individuals was enacted.
Forums for social consensus-building. As the key com ponent o f  its policy o f  
consensus-building as a way o f achieving social harmony, the Aylwin administration 
held annual forums for dialogue at which representatives o f Government, business and 
workers sat down at the same table to discuss and agree on specific minimum wage 
levels, minimum pensions and family allowances. All o f  the agreements reached were 
later endorsed unanimously by the legislature.
It was decided not to establish a rigid formal institution lor this purpose, but instead 
to invite relevant actors to participate voluntarily in each forum, so as to develop a 
"culture o f  negotiation and agreem ent” as a way o f  consolidating a style o f  labour 
relations compatible with social harmony. By this means, conflicts are settled at the 
negotiating table instead o f translating into mass protest or other forms o f  open or 
covert pressure exerted by any o f the parties involved.
Modernization of the capital market under a law promulgated in early March 1994, 
which makes existing rules more flexible, authorizes the creation o f  new financial 
instruments, facilitates investment and the sale o f  certificates abroad, increases 
(prudently) the amounts which pension funds are allowed to invest in various 
instruments and improves financial regulation. This law represents an attempt to 
reconcile greater incentives for investment with the need to safeguard public trust and 
properly manage conflicts o f interest.
Modernization of the banking system under a draft law, currently being considered  
in the legislature, whose objectives are similar to those o f the law on capital markets. 
The law also proposes an equitable market solution to a problem inherited from the 
early 1980s, when the financial "crash" gave rise to the so-called junior debt o f  some 
large private banks.
Extension of private investment to all sectors in which it was still prohibited by 
various long-standing legal provisions at the time President Aylwin took office. The 
new rules give private investment access to railroads, ports, large-scale copper mining 
and, in particular, public works infrastructure, under the new law on concessions 
passed in 1992, which authorizes private investment in roads, tunnels, sanitation 
works, etc., through long-term concessions financed with tolls paid by users.
Promotion and regulation of competition in various basic sectors o f  the economy, as 
exemplified by the fishing and telecommunications laws promulgated by the Aylwin 
administration.
Establishment of a new State institutional system in charge of public policies on the 
environment, under a "framework" law promulgated in the final days o f  the Aylwin 
administration. It consists o f a Committee o f Ministers, which acts as a higher 
coordinating body; som e o f the ministries represented concern issues that are highly 
sensitive from an ecological perspective (health, agriculture, mining), while others are 
related to econom ic developm ent (finance, econom ic affairs). The Com m ittee is 
chaired by a Minister in the political sphere —the Secretary-General o f the 
Presidency—, as an indication o f  the high priority assigned to the issue and the need  
to balance developm ent concerns with ecological ones. The technical arm o f  the new  
institution is a decentralized public service under the authority o f the Secretary- 
G eneral o f the Presidency. In addition, regional environmental commissions are to be 
established and headed by the regional governors.
As a means o f  modernizing the State with respect to the need to give due attention  
to new issues that are highly sensitive and significant, Chile has established the
National Women’s Service —headed by an official with the rank o f  a government 
minister— and the National Youth Institute.
n. In the Ministry of the Interior (equivalent to what other countries call the
Gobernación), a Department of Public Security has been established. At the same 
time, the police force (Carabineros de Chile) has been strengthened and various legal 
provisions have been adopted to make the fight against crime and drug trafficking 
more effective, and to prevent terrorism. Through these measures, the State has 
sought to provide effective answers to a real problem, which has becom e one o f  the 
population’s greatest concerns in recent years.
o. M oreover, progress has been made in modernizing the State with respect to decision­
making processes, cohesiveness of policies and programmes within the executive 
branch and better coordination and fluidity in its relations with the legislature and 
political parties.
To that end, the O ffice o f the Minister-Secretary-General o f  the Presidency was 
strengthened and given explicit responsibility for programme coordination. Moreover, 
interministerial coordination com mittees were set up, for which purpose the M inister’s 
cabinet was divided into five main areas: the Political Committee, the Economic 
Comm ittee, the Productive D evelopm ent Committee, the Social Comm ittee and the 
Infrastructure Committee. Likewise, a set procedure was established for elaborating 
and consulting on draft laws before submitting them to the legislature, and bipartite 
sectoral commissions were created for the exchange o f  advice and information 
between the Ministers (and their advisers) and the legislators o f  the corresponding 
commissions o f  the Senate and the Chamber o f  Deputies.
In sum, an institutional network for consultation, information and coordination has 
been established, and has undoubtedly helped to maintain cohesiveness in the 
Government, both within the executive branch and in its relations with legislators and 
the parties o f  the ruling coalition.
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p. A  rigorous procedure for the socio-economic assessment of public investment 
projects was devised a lew  years ago, and is still in full operation. The Ministry o f  
Planning and Coordination (M ID EPLA N ) is in charge o f this task, which it carries 
out in a territorially decentralized manner through outside consultants and its own 
specialists. In the approval process, the Ministry sets minimum levels o f  social benefits 
to be reaped from the projects, which are classified in decreasing order o f  benefit 
yields. N o investment project can be included in the public budget without the 
approval o f  M IDEPLAN, which adheres strictly to the evaluation procedure.
q. It should also be noted that the Government, by establishing a Studies Division
within the Office of the Secretary-General of the Presidency and systematically 
seeking advice from outside consultants, has introduced a strategic vision into State 
action which is periodically adapted to changes in circumstances, and serves as a kind 
o f  road map to steer government action. This represents an effort to overcom e the 
tendency o f Governments to become so mired in immediate concerns that they lose 
sight o f medium-term prospects.
r. The coordination and evaluation of the progress of government programmes have
been strengthened through the introduction of the so-called Ministerial Goals 
mechanism, also based in the Office o f the Secretary-General o f the Presidency. 
Every year, this office establishes the main action priorities for each Ministry, 
including inter alia the activities it carries out directly, its internal administrative 
reforms and its legislative programme. This instrument, which does not attempt to 
cover all the actions o f  every Ministry and is therefore considered a means o f  
selectively identifying priorities, was designed to com plem ent the control over the 
allocation o f the public budget exercised by the Ministry o f  Finance, whose 
Department o f  the Budget helps to elaborate and evaluate the Ministerial Goals.
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II.B. Evaluation of the reforms (coverage, irreversibility, legitimacy, 
sequence and comprehensiveness of the reform process)
T he preceding list covers both reforms o f  specific government policies and o f political and 
econom ic rules o f the game and changes in institutions and in public administration. The 
concept o f  State modernization has been interpreted here in a broad sense, considering the 
varied dimensions o f the State’s current situation and functions.
T he progress made thus far can be summarized as follows:
1. Political reforms have had the effect o f  legitimizing the existing institutional structure (the 
Constitution, labour relations, local governments, etc.) by winning acceptance from all 
relevant sectors o f  national opinion (including the military).
It is therefore safe to say that democracy has becom e firmly entrenched in the country, with 
no risk o f  a reversion to authoritarianism or ideological questioning by the right or left wing.
2. The decision to build a market econom y open to the outside world and dominated by the role 
o f  private enterprise is now recognized as the only viable developm ent strategy for the 
country. The Aylwin administration’s commitment to that strategy, based on its own 
convictions (and reaffirmed by the newly inaugurated Frei administration), has given this 
econom ic option the political and social legitimacy it lacked at the time o f  the transition to 
democracy, because it had been imposed by the authoritarian regime.
3. In the author’s view, the possibility o f sustaining current econom ic policies over time hinges 
on the country’s capacity to continue to reconcile the demands o f an export-led econom ic 
growth policy (m acroeconomic balances, stimulation o f  com petitiveness, incentives for 
investment, stable econom ic rules) with the requirements o f  an effective commitment to social 
equity (poverty reduction, equal opportunity, reasonable distribution o f  the benefits of 
progress among all sectors). In Chile, this has been termed growth with equity, and is 
considered an imperative for ensuring political stability, econom ic dynamism and social 
harmony. It is also an ongoing challenge, because even though such compatibility has been
shown to be possible, its existence is not guaranteed over time. In fact, its durability depends 
on both the effectiveness o f  econom ic and social policies and a consistently positive 
perception and assessment o f them on the part o f  the citizenry.
4. With respect to State modernization, progress has been partial but significant in the 
developm ent o f econom ic and social policy instruments, which must be constantly evaluated  
and com plem ented.
5. In the area o f public administration, the progress made to date, though also significant, is 
undoubtedly partial and insufficient. It must be acknowledged that the measures taken thus 
far are subject to revision and still in need o f  consolidation and expansion, and must also be 
extended to areas and sectors that have yet to be addressed.
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ISSUE III: T H E  M E A N I N G  O F  T H E  PROCESS O F  M O D E R N I Z A T I O N  O F  T H E  
STATE WITHIN T H E  F R A M E W O R K  O F  K E Y  D E V E L O P M E N T  OBJECTIVES
III.A. With respect to the consolidation of democracy
T he Chilean experience, characterized by a unique historical process w hose developm ent can only 
b e explained in the context o f its own circumstances, invokes in any case a set o f  reflections that 
appear relevant to any analysis o f  processes o f  democratic consolidation and modernization o f  the 
developing countries which, in short, face similar challenges in the spheres o f  politics, economics, 
society, culture and public administration.
In this respect, I would like to highlight the following particularly relevant aspects:
1. Irrespective o f  the unique aspects o f  the history o f each o f  the countries in Latin America, today 
they face the com m on challenge o f  consolidating democracy, achieving econom ic growth and ensuring 
social peace. T hese three elem ents are indissolubly linked and closely interdependent. W ithout the 
political stability that eliminates uncertainty, no growth will take place, because a sufficient and 
sustained level o f  investment will not have been achieved. For their part, the resources generated by 
growth are indispensable if we are to proceed responsibly with effective social policies, aimed at 
overcom ing poverty, achieving equality o f  opportunity and spreading progress to all sectors o f the 
population; in a democracy, this is a sine qua non for social peace. Finally, without social peace (a 
concept which does not imply a total absence o f  conflicts), there will be no political stability (a 
concept which, similarly, does not imply an absence o f  com petition and confrontation betw een the 
G overnm ent and the Opposition); and where such political stability is lacking, the process o f  business 
investment and innovation required for growth to occur will not take place.
2. T he great contemporary challenge for the governability o f the countries o f Latin America (and o f  
those countries on  other continents that have established or are advancing toward pluralist political 
regimes) consists in the simultaneous achievem ent o f these three factors (political stability, econom ic 
growth and social peace).
"The crucial point lies in conferring on the objective o f  social justice the equal degree o f  importance 
and equal urgency conferred on  developm ent in regard to econom ic growth. It is worth remembering 
that in the past the movements favoring the redistribution o f  income vastly underestimated growth, 
but also that the neoliberal movements have rejected the very concept o f distributive justice.
I firmly believe that it is vital to formulate econom ic growth and social equity as simultaneous 
objectives, as well as ensure that the majority o f the citizenry perceive this to be so, if there is to be 
a "societal coalition" supporting the developm ent strategy that guarantees governability over the 
medium term. I believe that what we have achieved in Chile -including inter alia tax reform, labour 
reform and wage agreements featuring regular increases in minimum incomes- has played a decisive 
role in the maintenance o f  a surprising popularity rating o f  60% or more for the G overnm ent at the 
end o f  four years in power.
A t the margin o f  the Chilean case, the existence o f a societal coalition as a condition for governability 
allows us, in turn, to m eet another requirement, namely the existence o f a political majority capable 
o f governing, making decisions and carrying them out effectively. Only the existence o f  a political 
majority with sufficient support in society makes it possible to avoid, on  the one hand, the populism  
which has plagued Latin America for so many decades, and on the other, the authoritarian temptation  
which arises when there is no perceptible progress and improvement in justice over time, which 
facilitates the em ergence o f strong men o f  various hues.
3. W hat I am affirming here is that growth and social equity are compatible, and that, furthermore, 
each needs the other in the medium term, as a condition o f  governability. This does not mean that 
ensuring that such compatibility is real does not represent a challenge o f  considerable magnitude; this 
state o f  affairs is amply illustrated by the examples that I have presented with respect to Chile. What 
is the most suitable level o f  taxation for collecting resources targeted at social developm ent while, at 
the sam e time, ensuring a flexible process o f  saving and investment? W hat labour practices best 
com bine the flexibility o f  the labour market necessary for the integration o f  a com petitive econom y  
into the international econom y (a process which implies permanent adjustments to the pattern o f  
production), with sufficient protection for the worker, who pays the immediate costs o f  those same 
adjustments? Achieving compatibility between growth and social equity is another vital condition for 
democratic governability in the medium term."1
4. Any policy o f developm ent in democracy which seeks to achieve stability, growth and social peace, 
requires a public institutional framework and mechanisms that link the Government, the other 
political actors (the Legislature, political parties and, where appropriate, regional authorities) and the 
relevant social organizations, so as to ensure the effectiveness o f  the concepts o f  majority rule and 
the social bases for support.
17
This means, at the least:
a) Internal cohesion in the G overnm ent’s programme; the mechanisms described in relation to Chile 
seek  to m eet that need.
b) T he strengthening and modernization o f the key institutions o f democracy, namely the Legislature 
and the political parties. In this connection, it is essential to implement or give maximum impetus to 
programmes that shore up the Legislature, as well as to initiatives that seek to institutionalize and 
m odernize politically and technically the political parties.
c) T he strengthening o f  highly representative organizations o f  the civil society, that can assume the 
role o f  valid and responsible partners o f the Government and that possess the necessary legitimacy 
and influence to ensure that their members, as well as the widest sections o f  society they can 
influence, honour the commitments that such em ployers’ organizations, trade unions, and professional 
or territorial associations have assumed. The policy o f  social reconciliation prom oted in Chile in 
recent years has been  made possible owing to the existence o f  representative social organizations. 
This policy has, in turn, strengthened these organizations both in terms o f  legitimacy and substantive 
capacity for action and influence.
5. The best conceived policies and the most modern institutional framework becom e discredited and 
are condem ned to failure, if, in the State and the political class in general, corruption is a reoccurring 
phenom enon or if the citizenry com e increasingly to suspect the existence o f corruption owing to a 
lack o f  transparency in public administration. The prevention o f  corruption and the rigorous 
punishment o f  those guilty o f  fraudulent acts constitute another precondition o f  democratic stability 
and sustained developm ent.
6. The existence o f  an independent, ethical and efficient justice system, which effectively protects the 
rights o f  individuals, is, like the factor m entioned in the previous point, with which it is closely 
associated, a precondition o f  stability and progress.
III.B. With respect to productivity and competitiveness
1. In order that the processes o f  investment and innovation necessary to enhance com petitiveness 
develop in a sustained and dynamic fashion, there is, in the first instance, a need for "stability and 
continuity o f  econom ic policies at the most basic level (i.e. an absence or reduction o f  uncertainty); 
this in turn translates into stable "ground rules" that facilitate decision-making, especially with regards 
to long-term investment, and implies, in short, respect for the basic logic underpinning the operation  
o f  private enterprise."1
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Stability must not, nor cannot, be taken to mean paralysis o f  the status quo or an absence o f  change. 
"What it does mean is that the principle o f  gradualness o f  political, econom ic and social change must 
be accepted: for the sake o f  continuity, there is a renunciation o f  radical and profound changes to 
the political, econom ic and social system over the short term. In a democracy, the consolidation o f  
change in a manner compatible with the operation o f  an econom y based on private enterprise 
requires social acceptance and the ability to absorb the change, and that is measured over the long 
term. In a democratic system, changes can be taken as accepted when, in the election  following the 
point in time in which a particular regime or Government implements them, they are ratified by a 
large majority o f  the electorate or they disappear from the agenda o f public debate. T he acceptance 
o f  the gradualness o f  change, or put another way, o f  a substantial degree o f  political, econom ic and 
social continuity, is a condition o f  governability in a democracy."1
2. The role o f  the State, beyond that o f  econom ic policies which maintain macroeconom ic equilibria 
and stimulate investment and exports, is to promote and safeguard com petition in all markets, as well 
as foster environmental policies, that, without curbing investment, ensure the sustainability o f  
developm ent over the long term.
The laws m entioned above in the case o f  Chile (concerning telecommunications, the stock market, 
banking transactions, the fishing industry, the environment, etc.) aim inter alia to promote 
com petition, protect such com petition from the em ergence o f  m onopolies, and stem environmental 
damage and wanton destruction o f  natural resources.
In particular, there is growing awareness o f  ecological issues, especially among young people. This 
poses environmental policy with the complex challenge o f  reconciling ecology with development, 
preserving the environment and reducing the various forms o f pollution, without raising the costs o f  
investment to levels that are incompatible with potential rates o f  developm ent.
In a similar vein, there is a need to strengthen the regulatory power o f the State, especially in those 
sectors where m onopolies or dominant firms tend to em erge (energy, telecommunications, the 
financial sector, etc.); this takes on particular relevance in an age when there is an inevitable decline 
in State ownership o f  businesses. The emphasis on regulation must, however, avoid divergence from 
the objectives o f  promoting and safeguarding effective and transparent com petition, leading to a new  
form o f  interventionism and State control o f  econom ic activity.
3. T he privatization o f public corporations has becom e a "matter o f  conventional wisdom" and a 
central pillar o f many policies o f  econom ic reform. There are instances in which this process can
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advance without major difficulties or political opposition, but there are also instances in which, at 
least in a number o f  sectors, the issue has becom e a matter o f political and social controversy. 
Confronted with such a set o f  circumstances, Governments are accustomed to go back on their 
intentions, discontinuing or postponing these processes.
The contention that all public corporations are, by definition, inefficient and must therefore be 
privatized holds little water in my view. If privatization is set forth as a problem o f  ideology, it is 
highly likely to becom e a contentious issue, given the customary opposition mounted, for specific and 
understandable reasons by, for example, the unions representing workers in any State corporation  
facing privatization. Similarly, under a democracy, the processes o f  privatization must be totally 
transparent, in such a way that there are no grounds for suspecting that such processes are being 
conducted to the improper or illegal advantage o f individuals or firms in the political or private 
sphere.
There are, however, a number o f  reasons for contending that there is a trend for State corporations 
to have a progressively reduced relative presence in the domestic economy, o f  which the following 
should be pointed out:
i. The lack o f  compatibility betw een the requirement to invest in social programmes and infrastructure 
as key and unavoidable responsibilities o f  the State, and the need to invest resources for the 
expansion o f  public corporations that encounter profitable opportunities or projects.
ii. The need, in an open  and com petitive economy, for wages to be set in relation to productivity, in 
flexible labour markets (with adequate protection for the worker); this is difficult to achieve in public 
corporations, in which negotiations o f such issues are inevitably political and where the immobility 
o f  labour is traditionally very highly.
iii. T he political pressure placed on State corporations’ boards o f  directors, whether concerning the 
hiring o f  staff or the undertaking o f  objectives that are incompatible with sound business management 
practices, such as attempts at redistribution targeting certain sectors o f  the population or geographical 
areas. There is no doubt that the State should make subsidies in line with a specific decision to do 
so, expressed in the G overnm ent budget and not hidden by the lower profitability o f  a particular 
enterprise.
4. O ne important aspect o f  the modernization o f the State in relation to improved productivity is the 
establishm ent o f  a public institutional framework and effective support mechanisms for small-sized 
enterprises. Large enterprises flourish on account o f their own efforts and only need an adequate 
framework in which to develop. The same cannot be said in the case o f  small-scale enterprises, which
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are obliged to improve their management skills and gain access to technological innovation, credit and 
staff training. T he private sector can operate many o f these programmes itself, but there is 
undoubtedly a need for State stimulus and the mobilization o f  public resources.
III.C. With respect to the achievement of social equity and environmental sustainability
1. M ention has already been made in previous paragraphs o f the challenge for developm ent posed  
by the application o f  an environmental policy that reconciles ecology with developm ent. For this to 
happen, there is a need for a public institutional framework, a suitable legal framework and effective  
policy instruments. T he latter include environmental impact studies and their assessment by the 
com petent authority on the basis o f  objective and transparent criteria, regulations and standards 
governing the quality o f the environment, the formulation o f  environmental cleanup plans and 
em ergency plans to deal with critical situations, the possibility o f implementing market mechanisms 
which redistribute actual pollution among the polluters in accordance with technological and 
econom ic conditions, etc.
T he public institutional framework must extend to all sectors and regions o f every country. So, instead 
o f setting up a Ministry o f the Environment as the only authority on the matter, Chile opted to set 
up environmental units in various ministries, establish an interministerial coordination mechanism and 
create a decentralized public service.
2. A  precondition for obtaining greater levels o f  social equity is the achievem ent o f high growth and 
low inflation, so as to generate employment and ensure a rise in real wages and incomes o f workers, 
these being the group most adversely affected by unemployment and inflation.
3. Social policies should be designed increasingly to replace mere welfarism by what we in Chile have 
called programmes to integrate into development, which are conducive to self-sufficiency for the most 
vulnerable sectors o f  society; this is because social welfare does not eradicate poverty but rather 
serves only to ward o ff or reduce its most obvious symptoms, for the duration o f  the respective 
programmes.
4. From a more general point o f view, attention could be drawn to the fact that the structure o f the 
State and modern public management should agree inter alia on the following instruments, with an 
emphasis on  each that is desired or possible:
a) W elfare programmes, for the benefit o f  those living in indigence or extreme poverty, which m eet 
the administrative challenge that calls for ever more efficient targeting, thus reducing "leakages" to 
less needy groups.
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b) Education and training at the primary, secondary and technical/vocational levels as the main tool 
in the achievem ent o f  true equality o f  opportunity; for this reason, emphasis should be placed both  
on access to education and on the attainment o f  the same level o f  quality in urban and rural districts, 
and in rich and poor ones.
c) O ther social policies (health, housing, parks and gardens), as instruments for raising and leveling 
the quality o f  life.
d) Support for independent econom ic initiatives by the poor, through the setting up o f  small 
businesses and other forms o f  self-employment.
e) T he redistribution o f  assets, not in the sense o f the expropriation o f  assets, but rather through 
access to ownership for the vast majority o f  the population. The AFP schem e, pertaining to private 
pension funds, has, among other merits, converted millions o f  Chileans into shareholders in large 
private firms; this has undoubtedly had a stabilizing and democratizing effect, because it has provided 
a greater proportion o f  the population with an active stake in ensuring that the firm prospers and 
makes profits. This instrument may well prove key in the achievem ent o f  greater social legitimacy by 
the market econom y.
f) Finally, a policy o f  social equity must contain significant features for "empowering the 
disadvantaged." O ne contribution to this end involves the strengthening o f  social organizations, such 
as the most recent Chilean labour reform, which has placed the unions on a more equal footing with 
their counterparts from the ranks o f employers in the collective bargaining process. Other areas o f  
reform which deserve examination in this context include the transfer o f  powers and the capacity to 
manage social services or other activities to neighbourhood or community organizations.
2 2
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SUBJECT AR E A  IV: R E F O R M  A N D  M O D E R N IZATION STRATEGY: 
AREAS O F  INTERVENTION, R O A D S  T O  C H A N G E
IV.A. General observations
1. A  country’s developm ent is an ongoing process o f  progress, modernization and rising 
productivity. The modernization o f the State should also be understood as a process that 
seeks greater effectiveness and efficiency, which requires increasing productivity. Given the 
nature o f  the State, its modernization also implies more coherent and effective policies and 
due care for its social legitimacy. As m entioned earlier, in the context o f  the essentially 
political and social problem o f  governability, the modernization o f  State administration 
constitutes a technical dimension and unites the technical and political dimensions o f  this vast 
issue.
2. The modernization o f  State administration should be formulated in terms o f  and based on its 
different roles, including all their priorities, sequences and specificities that need to be spelled  
out. For the purposes o f  this study, they can be classified as follows:
a. Traditional functions: Public order and citizen safety, justice, foreign relations, 
defence.
b. Responsibility for the efficient functioning and improvement of political institutions 
and relations. This responsibility belongs to society as a whole, but the State plays a 
vital role.
c. Framework for growth and the development of private-sector production.
i. Macroeconomic function, namely, responsibility for econom ic policy.
ii. Support for the private sector in what is needed in each specific 
period: small and medium-size enterprises, technological innovation, 
training, education, export promotion, new market penetration, etc.
iii. Regulation. A  State that largely abandons its past entrepreneurial role 
increases its regulatory responsibility. It has to promote and preserve 
com petition, ensure market transparency, and defend consumer and 
user rights, all without converting regulations into a new form o f  
dirigisme or State intervention that restricts liberties and contradicts 
the normal "rules o f  functioning" o f  private econom ic activity.
iv. Policy on public enterprises. As m entioned earlier, the problem with 
State enterprises is not that they are intrinsically less efficient than 
private enterprises. The modernization o f  the State in this regard 
should not be approached ideologically (neither privatize on principle 
nor oppose privatization because o f  a doctrine) nor from the dogmatic 
perspective o f  a supposed superiority o f  private management. It is 
necessary to take into account and duly assess, in each case, certain 
adverse conditions that public enterprises normally face, which were 
mentioned previously.
d. Social policies, social investment and provision of social services.
This is the key function o f a modern State in a process o f  growth with social equity, 
in which the private sector is the main engine o f growth, in so far as it corresponds 
to the State to promote and guarantee social equity (through anti-poverty and equal- 
opportunity programmes).
e. Public policies and action programmes in areas in which a collective will is 
expressed, and the State’s subsequent political decision for ongoing initiative.
This is the case o f  the environment, youth, w om en’s issues, the family, etc.
Conclusion. All this leads to the conclusion that the modern State will be different but no 
less important than the State in previous periods o f  Latin American developm ent. It may be 
smaller in size, but it will have to have more political and technical capacity, be more agile 
and flexible, and less bureaucratic.
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3. On the other hand, the modernization of State administration is also, in its technical
dimension, a multidimensional task with various factors. Although these dimensions are
intertwined, it is helpful to distinguish them for purposes o f  analysis and to priortize them and
place them  in sequence. W e distinguish:
a. Institutions and public relations.
b. Human resources: personnel in public administration.
c. Public administration: Administration, "managerial" functions, administrative 
procedures, operational efficiency, implementation: do things and do them well.
d. Roles of the State: Provision o f  services, formulation o f  public policies, entrepreneur, 
regulator.
e. Structure of the public sector: Attributes, functions and responsibilities o f  ministries 
and public services; coherence and cohesion in public action.
f. Decision-making process, with due attention to its technical and policy dimensions 
and the need for both to be integrated and coherent.
g. Decentralization as an increasingly important process that influences all the above 
aspects, which already cannot be analysed without explicitly considering this factor.
In examining these different dimensions o f  State administration, any reform proposal 
should be assessed on  the basis o f  whether or not it improves public action in relation  
to one or more o f  the essential capacities that every effective modernization should  
strengthen, namely:
i. A greater capacity for exercising authority in a participative democratic 
framework, i.e., more expeditious and coherent decisions backed by maximum 
legitimacy (which does mean unanimous backing for the substance o f  the 
decision but rather social acceptance o f  the procedure).
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ii. A greater capacity for solving problems, i.e., a substantive technical 
improvement.
iii. A  greater capacity for resolving conflicts, i.e., an improvement in the socio­
political process with substantive technical support for generating technically 
sound and socially sustainable solutions.
iv. A greater operational efficiency, i.e., timely and faithful implementation o f  
decisions.
4. "Above all, it has to be remembered that the Latin American State is a State o f developing
countries. Therefore, it cannot be expected to be more developed than the respective country 
as a whole. This is a key idea, given the negative judgement and acid criticism usually given 
to the public sectors o f  Latin America. This does not lessen the urgency o f  modernizing these  
sectors to make them more efficient, but it does mean that we are not going to radically 
change that State overnight, and that its modernization is going to be part o f  the country’s 
overall process o f modernization and developm ent. It could be accelerated somewhat, and 
hopefully so, but it will never be far from the rate o f  national progress".1
5. For that reason, the modernization o f  State administration should be understood as a
continuous process o f multiple tasks and challenges that unfolds on the basis o f  partial and 
sequential reforms, structured on the identification o f  priorities, urgencies and opportunities.
It is a fact that international experience in this area shows that ambitious projects o f  integral 
reform almost inevitably fail. Such projects do not take into account the limited capacity to 
absorb change in any given historical moment.
This limitation arises from objective factors, such as the following, which can be summarized 
under the generic concept o f "transition costs":
a. T he inevitable "bureaucratic resistance" to change;
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b. T he probable differences o f  judgement about the best solutions for the situation, or
about the problem to be solved;
c. The disruption caused by the discontinuity associated with change; the spread o f
discontinuity through public administration normally produces serious breakdowns of 
indispensable formal routines.
d. T he cost o f learning and assimilating the new rules.
6. Any project to reform public administration should consider the reality o f  the country at the 
m om ent o f  implementation. Thus, for example, in a country that is progressing and living a 
period o f  expansion, basic consensuses and an optimistic view o f  the future, the natural 
tendency is to continue doing the same thing at all levels. In a period o f  crisis, to the contrary, 
the need for change is widely accepted, including, certainly, the State apparatus.
7. All things considered, only that which can be digested in a given moment and which is clearly 
a priority should be attempted. Deciding in this regard is a question o f  criteria, but also o f  
timeliness. "Relatively ambitious reforms should be undertaken (according to conventional 
wisdom) at the beginning o f  an administration. The first year o f  Government is the best time 
for a sweeping modernization o f  the State, but if it is to succeed, efforts must continue 
throughout the term. Reforms have to have been prepared in advance. If a Government starts 
at square one when it takes office -w h ich  has been the general rule in Latin America, given 
the tradition o f  discontinuity in its policy and administrative managem ent— only beginning to 
plan what it is going to do, by the time it has finished preparing its specific modernization  
project, the period when it would have been politically viable will have passed. A  basic 
elem ent o f  continuity, then, is preparing public administration in advance, in consultation with 
those w ho could be successors (be they political allies or in opposition), so that the new  
administration can implement at once the most urgent reforms".1
rV.B.Priority reform areas: (tentative suggestions about difficult issues).
For me, the first and most fundamental o f  these areas is what can generically be called 
personnel policy, dealing with wages and civil service careers. The reality o f  public 
administration in most Latin American countries, and certainly in mine, is one o f  growing 
imbalance. Faced with a dynamically expanding private sector, public-sector professional wages 
rapidly deteriorate in relation to private-sector wages. However, administrative personnel, who 
normally have tenure as civil servants and have a certain capacity for political pressure, can 
achieve, in the less skilled sector, wages equal to or even higher than their counterparts in 
the private sector. For this reason, simple formal solutions -su ch  as the concept o f  the single 
wage sc a le -  do not work, i f  a single scale is established in order to attract high-level 
professionals, the State cannot bear the cost if it attempts to apply it equally to all. On the 
other hand, if wages are kept within a range that is politically viable, establishing a scale that 
avoids open conflict with the administrative personnel o f the State, it will be impossible to 
attract and retain high-level professional personnel".1
This is a key dilemma. There is no clear solution, but there are paths we can explore. W e 
have to reject any formula that is not transparent, secret or involves wages from different 
budgetary sources, since these formulae lead to a loss o f  prestige, produce conflicts and 
political upheavals and becom e unsustainable. M ore imaginative solutions are needed.
In terms o f  modernization o f  the State, what is needed is to attract and retain for a prudent 
amount o f  time a sufficient nucleus o f high-level personnel, and to develop an organizational 
culture, a collective attitude o f  public em ployees centred more on serving the user than on 
their own problems as civil servants. I think the wage levels o f  public professionals can be 
raised, with a percentage o f  their pay exempt from deductions, for a certain number o f  years, 
in a way that is not part o f a permanent formal wage structure.
A  sufficient number o f the best university graduates can be attracted to public service or a 
reasonable period o f time. These young professionals, if they are capable, will make a positive
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1. "Personnel policy
contribution if they remain in public service for five to seven years. Som e o f  them will later 
advance to political-level posts and will remain in the public sector; others will continue their 
careers in academic life or in the private sector, with a bright future, given their experience 
and status acquired in public service.
R eal incentive systems have to be established in order to promote the right attitude among 
public em ployees. Experience shows that, generally speaking, effective mechanisms for reward 
and punishment do not exist. Evaluation systems usually turn into human-relations problems 
among the managers who evaluate their subordinates, if the manager does not evaluate 
everybody on merit. Perhaps something simpler is needed: it could, for example, be taken as 
a norm that the majority are good, but not excellent, public em ployees, Evaluations could 
seek  to identify a limited number o f people worthy o f  special distinction, giving them the right 
to be promoted, while another minority, evaluated as performing poorly, can abandon public 
service if that evaluation is repeated, with tenure having no effect for them, and that most 
o f  the personnel be considered in the category o f  normal performance.
2. Decision-making process
The most important part o f  decision-making is having systematic, relevant, timely and reliable 
information and selecting it well, since an excess o f  information can be as harmful as the lack 
o f  it. The timeliness and relevance o f  information are fundamental, therefore it is essential 
that information be transmitted from its source to its users in a systematic and routine 
fashion. The second most important part is analysis. Informed decisions require analysis, which 
in turn requires organization.
In Chile, w e tried to generate within the Executive Branch som ething very difficult to achieve: 
analysis units which, at the general policy decision-making level, integrate the political and 
econom ic dimensions with social considerations. The goal was integrated analysis. This is not 
analysis made by politicians advising a president, which be definition is also political. Nor is 
it merely technical analysis, like that required by finance ministers. At the central policy level, 
it is essential that these different variables be integrated through a process that relates them 
to on e another, in order to elaborate a technical and political synthesis.
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It is also essential that this analysis can maintain a good balance between short- and medium- 
term considerations.
Governing -carrying out the roles o f  government within the State apparatus- almost 
inevitably leads to the predominance o f day-to-day problems and to the risk o f  losing sight 
o f  the strategic dimension and medium-term consequences. T he coherence and continuity o f  
governing can be seriously affected if immediate concerns consum e all attention and energies, 
a tendency that must be effectively resisted.
To illustrate this problem with an example from Chile, in the Ministry that I headed, the 
O ffice o f  the Minister-Secretary General o f the Presidency, we established, as mentioned  
earlier, a research department with the specific mission o f issuing periodical reports on the 
medium-term prospects o f  the country, as well as on more relevant day-to-day concerns. In 
doing so, political leaders, social actors, academics, et al., both in favour and against the 
Government, were consulted.
It is essential to consult non-governmental organizations, including academic organizations. 
For government action to be more effective, inputs are needed from outside the State in 
terms o f  what can be defined as independent or autonomous, but loyal and constructive 
criticism.
A  third aspect o f the decision-making process is coordination. In dealing with any particular 
subject, all those w hose criterion or opinion is needed must be consulted. This makes it 
necessary to establish mechanisms for relationships and coordination.
T o illustrate what I mean by mechanisms for relationships, allow me to give another example 
from Chile. W e established as formal mechanisms -w h ich  function in a routine and stable 
fa sh io n - bipartisan commissions comprised, on the one hand, o f  ministers o f  State and their 
technical advisors, and on the other, the counterpart sectoral commissions o f  Congress and 
the technical staffs o f  the political parties that support the Government. This allows for an 
exchange o f  information and criteria that contributes to more effective legislative and political 
action, while at the same time gathering the political decisions and viewpoints o f  those actors,
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which is vital for orienting the decisions that the Executive Branch has to take. Second, the 
Executive Branch needs internal coordination mechanisms that go beyond the concept o f  
Cabinet as a collective entity. The Cabinet, understood as the group o f  ministers presided 
over by the President o f  the Republic, is not an efficient instrument for decision-making and 
coordination. There are too many ministers. Cabinet meetings provide information and allow  
the President to orient his collaborators, but they do not normally take decisions.
W ith respect to coordination among ministries, I would like to point out that, to achieve 
governability and the continuity and cohesion o f  policies, within the Executive Branch, the 
minister or ministers responsible for the political area must have a close and fluid 
relationship with the minister or ministers responsible for managing the economy.
Historically, Ministers o f  Finance and Econom ic Affairs have tended to remain isolated from 
those who pressure from society and even their own colleagues. In our experience in Chile 
during these years, the cohesion between the G overnm ent’s political and econom ic teams was 
decisive for ensuring the continuity o f  policies.
It is my belief, therefore, that when choosing collaborators, every president should seek  to 
ensure a high probability o f  concerted action and real alliance between his main econom ic  
minister and his key political ministers. It is also important that there be occasions when the 
growing proportion o f  problems that transcend a given sector are analysed and solutions 
agreed upon. This is obvious for the environment or youth and women. But agricultural, 
education and health-care problems also often transcend their own sector.
Therefore, for State action to be cohesive, inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms are 
required. As m entioned previously, in Chile we established a number o f  inter-ministerial 
com m ittees, dividing the Cabinet into five areas: econom ic, production developm ent, social, 
infrastructure, and political, which generated the capacity to coordinate different matters more 
fully. T he joint participation o f  ministers and advisors in different com m ittees ensures, in turn, 
that the political and technical dimensions o f  problems are integrated.
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3. Policy and programme implementation
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Lastly, w e have to look at the problem o f  making sure that things get done. In the public 
administration o f  our countries and among political leaders, one often has the impression that 
simply enacting laws can solve problems, that establishing an institution on paper is effectively 
facing a problem, or that taking a decision and communicating it those affected puts an end  
to a problem. W e all know that this is hardly the case, and that the decisive aspect o f  State 
programmes and policies is their implementation. What is often  forgotten or ignored is that 
the process o f  implementing policies is also normally a political battlefield, because those who 
feel that their interests are negatively affected by a given decision can consider this the best 
time to block it by preventing things from getting done. This fact, together with the weakness 
o f  public administration, obliges us to give special attention to implementation. Here, I simply 
want to say that implementation has, obviously, an administrative dimension with respect to 
efficient procedures, new management methods, the possible transfer o f management —even  
to private agencies— all o f  which is part o f necessary modernization. However, in 
im plementing programmes and policies, attention also must be given to the roadblocks thrown 
up by the organized political resistance o f those who seek  to stop what on paper has 
apparently already been decided. This leads us to consider strategies for publicity and winning 
the support o f  public opinion, as well as eventual com pensation for the "losers", and other 
forms o f pressure and negotiation.
4. Instrument for programming and monitoring the administration of public programmes
W ith respect to this question, I would only like to reiterate and develop what I said earlier 
about our experience in Chile. Even though we still need to improve our budget process and 
our mechanisms for evaluating public investment projects, I would like to suggest that in our 
country we have consolidated a new instrument for programming and monitoring the 
administration o f  public programmes, which we call "ministerial goals".
W e define "ministerial goal" as any activity o f  significant priority that a ministry is committed  
to carrying out in a given calendar year. This includes, therefore, operative programmes o f  
direct action or contracted out to third parties, investment projects, draft laws to be presented
and processed in Parliament, administrative acts (regulations, guidelines, etc.), formulation and 
implementation o f policies within its com petency, or negotiations with specific groups or 
sectors.
Therefore, this instrument is different from the budget. By limiting it to significant priorities, 
it makes no attempt to cover all the activities o f  the ministry that involve expenditures. It 
does include, however, different actions that might not require any expenditures, as in the 
case o f  legislative or regulatory initiatives. Ministerial goals em phasize qualitative objectives 
expressed in terms o f  results that are not always measured by the size o f  the expenditure 
involved.
Therefore, ministerial goals should be understood as an instrument that goes hand-in-hand 
with the budget. What is good about it is that it tries to identify programmatic priorities with 
all their ramifications, recognizing the essentially political nature o f  that exercise.
Ministerial goals have facilitated the G overnm ent’s task o f  having a sufficiently detailed  
overview o f  its priorities in each sector o f  the administration, monitoring their progress 
throughout the course o f  the year, and eventually assessing the results. For this last purpose, 
the President o f  the Republic established a formal process for evaluating during January o f  
each year the action o f  each ministry during the year that just ended, which, in turn, helped  
identify the ministerial goals for the following period. In July, the O ffice o f the Minister- 
Secretary G eneral o f  the Presidency carries out an advanced evaluation o f  the goals for the 
current year.
It is important to remember that the main objective o f  this mechanism is not supervision, but 
rather to provide an instrument that helps to foresee and overcom e political, administrative 
or financial obstacles faced in pursuing the proposed goals.
In the process o f  elaborating and following up on ministerial goals, the initiative and central 
coordination falls to the O ffice o f  the Minister-Secretary General o f  the Presidency through 
its Division o f  Interministerial Coordination. But the annual instructions distributed to the 
ministries are drawn up and agreed to by the O ffice o f  the Minister-Secretary General o f  the
Presidency, the Ministry o f  Finance and the Ministry o f Planning and Cooperation, all o f  
which sign the respective documents.
5. A  new concept and role for planning
Changes in the world have rendered the traditional concept o f  planning passé. This was 
clearly the case with the centralized planning o f the East-Block countries. The same has 
happened to so-called democratic planning which, to a large extent, was a concept based on  
the technocratic illusion that it was possible to lead a country to the "optimum solution" 
designed by the planners, which in turn was based on the predominance o f the State over the 
market and private enterprise in econom ic matters.
Abandoning this kind o f  planning, however, should not lead to the conclusion that the State 
has no legitimate and necessary function in responding to the need to conceive o f  and carry 
out what in more political and modern language could be called a "country ideal".
Ultimately, it is a question o f  generating a national consensus about a long-term framework 
for orienting a developm ent process in which all the actors can "row" together in the same 
direction, consequently with more efficient results. This framework cannot be very precise or 
detailed. It has to be flexible, adaptable, indicative and the product o f  the participation and 
contributions o f  a multitude o f  actors. The concept o f "strategic planning" seem s to respond 
adequately to these requirements.
This gives rise, then, to the question o f  how to create and strengthen this function within the 
State apparatus, with no pretensions o f  domination or political or bureaucratic hegemony.
First, w e have to recognize that the integrated view o f a "country ideal" is an inevitable and 
em inently political notion with a technocratic dimension that recognizes basic com ponents 
arising from different spheres o f  objective reality.
W ith this framework, strategic planning can be conceived o f  on the basis o f  a functional and 





a. Establish "top seeds" in the ministries, responsible for coordinating strategic planning 
and studies in their respective sectors, units or divisions (public services with small 
groups o f  high-level professionals). T hese units will provide the aforem entioned  
com m ittees with analytical material and proposals for strategic orientation and 
medium-term policies.
b. Such studies and strategic planning units or divisions could be established in the 
following areas o f  State action:
i) M acroeconom ic analysis and projection
ii) Productive developm ent, integrating sectoral overviews in agriculture, mining, 
industry, commerce, etc.
iii) Infrastructure (public works, transport, energy)
iv) Social developm ent (education, housing, health care, poverty, family, youth, 
w om en’s issues, etc.), perhaps incorporating here the regional and local 
dimensions
v) Foreign policy, integrating the political and econom ic dimensions o f  
international relations.
The integration o f  all o f  this into an overall view could be the task o f  a coordinating political 
ministry, for example, the O ffice o f the Minister-Secretary General o f  the Presidency in the 
case o f  Chile, since the end result has the basically political character o f  constituting an image 
o f the future or a view o f  the country ideal that could serve as a com mon framework for all 
the relevant actors in the country’s affairs.
In ending, I would only like to reiterate that the modernization o f  the State is part o f  the 
political process o f  each country. The construction o f  basic political consensuses, the existence  
o f a political majority in Government, sufficient social support for improving democratic 
institutions, econom ic growth and socially equitable progress are all interconnected conditions 
for stability and development.
Our countries are facing, then, a tremendous challenge and must undertake tasks o f  enormous 
proportions. The modernization o f State administration is one o f  those immense priority tasks. 
Its success is conditioned on the existence o f  sufficiently favourable conditions at different 
levels, as m entioned earlier. Undertaking this task with determination and persistence is a 
necessary condition for achieving lasting progress in the political, econom ic and social fields.
1 S ee  "La Governabilidad: U n concepto Multidimensional", a document by the author presented to 
the seminar on "State, D evelopm ent and Stability", held by the Inter-American D evelopm ent Bank, 
W ashington, D.C., April 1993.
36

Impreso an Naciones Unidas -  Santiago de Chila
